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Abstract—We consider secret key generation from relative
localization information of a pair of nodes in a mobile wireless
network in the presence of a mobile eavesdropper. Our problem
can be categorized under the source models of information
theoretic secrecy, where the distance between the legitimate
nodes acts as the observed common randomness. We characterize
the theoretical limits on the achievable secret key bit rate, in
terms of the observation noise variance at the legitimate nodes
and the eavesdropper. This work provides a framework that
combines information theoretic secrecy and wireless localization,
and proves that the localization information provides a significant
additional resource for secret key generation in mobile wireless
networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider the generation of a common key in a pair of
nodes, which move in R2 (continuous space) according to a
stochastic mobility model. We exploit the reciprocity of the
distance between a given pair of locations, view the distance
between the legitimate nodes as a common randomness shared
by these nodes and utilize it to generate secret key bits using
the ideas from source models of secrecy [1].
Unlike the recent plethora of studies (see Section I-A for a
brief list of related papers) that focuses on wireless channel
reciprocity, a variety of technologies can be used for localiza-
tion (e.g., ultrasound, infrared, Lidar, Radar, wireless radios),
which makes distance reciprocity an additional resource for
generating secret key bits. Such versatility makes the key
generation systems more robust, since different technologies
may have different capabilities that wireless RF does not have.
For instance, narrow beam width of infrared systems would
make them less susceptible to eavesdropping from different
angles. Distance reciprocity is highly robust, since the distance
measured between any pair of points is identical, regardless of
which point the measurement originates. (e.g., when there is no
line-of sight, or when different frequency bands are used each
way). Yet, there are various challenges in obtaining reciprocal
distance measurements.
In this paper, we analyze the theoretical limits of key
generation using localization in the following system. We
assume that mobile nodes obtain observations regarding the
sequence of distances between them over a period of time as
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they move in the area. The measurements can be obtained ac-
tively through exchange of wireless radio, ultrasound, infrared
beacons, or passively by processing existing video images, etc.
The beacon signal may contain explicit information such as a
time stamp, or the receiving node can extract other means of
localization information by analyzing angle of arrival, received
signal strength, etc. The nodes perform localization based on
the observations of distances, and the statistics of the mobility
model, and obtain estimates of their relative locations with
respect to each other. Then, the nodes communicate over the
public channel to agree on a secret key. The generated key
bits satisfy the following three quality measures: i) reliability,
ii) secrecy, and iii) randomness. For reliability, we show that
the probability of mismatch between the keys generated by the
legitimate nodes decays to 0 with increasing block length. In
our attacker model, we consider a passive eavesdropper, that
overhears the exchanged beacons in the first phase, and the
public discussion in the third phase, and tries to deduce the
generated key based solely on these observations. The attacker
can follow various mobility strategies in order to enhance
its position statistically to reduce the achievable key rate
(possibly to 0). We assume that the attacker does not actively
interfere with the observation phase, e.g., by injecting jamming
signals, etc., in order not to reveal its presence. For secrecy,
we consider Wyner’s notion, i.e., the rate at which mutual
information on the key leaks to the eavesdropper should be
arbitrarily low. For randomness, the generated key bits have
to be perfectly compressed, i.e., the entropy should be equal
to the number of bits it contains.
We mainly focus on information theoretic limits. Using a
source model of secrecy [1], we characterize the achievable
secret key bit rate in terms of observation noise parameters at
the legitimate nodes and the eavesdropper under two different
cases of global location information (GLI): (i) No GLI, in
which the nodes do not observe their global locations directly,
and (ii) perfect GLI, in which nodes have perfect observation
of their global locations, through a GPS device, for example.
While the bounds we provide are general for a large set of
observation statistics, we further investigate the scenario in
which the observation noise is i.i.d. Gaussian for all nodes:
We study the observation SNR asymptotics, and show a phase-
transition phenomenon for the key rate. In particular, we prove
that the secret key rate grows unboundedly as the observation
noise variance decays, if the eavesdropper does not obtain the
angle of arrival observations. Otherwise, it is not possible to
increase the secret key rate beyond a certain limit. Then, we
2evaluate the theoretical performance numerically for a simple
grid-type model, as a function of beacon power. We also
evaluate the performance for the case where the eavesdropper
strategically changes its location to reduce the secret key rate.
Specifically, we consider the strategy where the eavesdropper
moves to the middle of its location estimates of the legitimate
nodes. We show that with this strategy, the eavesdropper can
significantly reduce the secret key rate compared to the case
where it follows a random mobility pattern.
In summary, our main contribution is to illustrate that
relative localization information can be used as an additional
resource for secret key generation (see Section I-A for a
comparison with related work).
A. Related Work
Generation of secret key from relative localization informa-
tion can be categorized under source model of information
theoretic secrecy, which studies generation of secret key bits
from common randomness observed by legitimate nodes. In
his seminal paper [1], Maurer showed that, if two nodes
observe correlated randomness, then they can agree on a secret
key through public discussion. He provided upper and lower
bounds on the achievable secret key rates. Although the bounds
have been improved later [2], [3], the secret key capacity of
the source model in general is still an open problem. Despite
this fact, the source model has been utilized in several different
settings [4]–[6].
There is a vast amount of literature on localization (see,
e.g., [8], [9] for wireless localization, [15] for infrared lo-
calization, and [16] for ultrasound localization). There has
been some focus on secure localization and position-based
cryptography [10]–[13], however, these works either consider
key generation in terms of other forms of secrecy (i.e.,
computational secrecy), or fall short of covering a complete
information theoretic analysis.
A similar line of work in wireless network secrecy considers
channel identification [14] for secret key generation using
wireless radios. Based on the channel reciprocity assumption,
nodes at both ends experience the same channel, corrupted
by independent noise. Therefore, nodes can use their channel
magnitude and phase response observations to generate secret
key bits from public discussion. The literature on channel
identification based secret key generation is vast. The works
[20]–[25] study key generation with on-the-shelf devices,
under 802.11 development platform using a two way radio
signal exchange on the same frequency. [27], on the other
hand, utilizes the fact that fading is highly correlated on
locations that are less than a half wavelength apart, instead
of exploiting the reciprocity. Therefore, very close nodes can
use public radio signals (e.g., FM, TV, WiFi) to generate secret
key bits.
In most of these works, the security analysis is based on
the assumption that the channel gains are modeled as random
processes, that are independent of the distances between the
nodes, and are independent at locations that are more than a
few wavelengths apart. While being appropriate for a non line-
of-sight and highly dynamic media, these models do not cap-
ture wireless propagation in environments where attenuation is
a function of the propagation distance. In such environments,
an attacker that has some localization capabilities will gain
a statistical advantage by estimating the channel gains based
on its distance observations. If the key generation process
ignores this advantage, part of the key may be recovered by
the attacker and thus the key cannot be perfectly secure. For
instance, Jana et. al. [21] focuses on a scenario in which secret
key bits based on the received signal strength (RSSI), and
show that an eavesdropper that knows the location of the
legitimate nodes can launch a mobility attack to force the
legitimate nodes to generate deterministic key bits, by period-
ically blocking and un-blocking their line-of-sight. Similarly,
if the eavesdropper is close (less than a wavelength) to one of
the legitimate nodes, then eavesdropper will obtain correlated
information [27], therefore the generated key will not be
perfectly secure, and secrecy outage occurs. The practical
applicability of exploiting channel reciprocity for secret key
generation has also been questioned recently in [26]. It is
shown that, especially when the nodes have sufficient mobility,
the eavesdropper’s and the legitimate receiver’s channel can
be significantly correlated depending on the locations, which
breaks the secrecy of the initial generated key.
On the other hand, key generation based on locations does
not make such independence assumptions. The dependencies
in the locations of the legitimate nodes and the observations
of the attacker with those of the legitimate nodes are taken
into account to provide provably security against a mobile
eavesdropper with localization capability. Thus, the insights
provided in this paper can also be valuable for the class of
studies on key generation based on wireless channel reci-
procity, as we show how one should capture a variety of
capabilities of the attackers in finding the correct rate for the
key and in designing the appropriate mechanisms to generate
a truly secret key.
A word about notation: We use [x]+ = max(0, x) and ‖.‖
denotes the L2-norm. A brief list of variables used in the paper
can be found in Table I.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Mobility Model
We consider a simple network consisting of two mobile
legitimate nodes, called user 1 and 2, and a possibly mobile
eavesdropper e. We divide time uniformly into n discrete
slots. Let lj [i] ∈ L be the random variable that denotes
the coordinates of the location of node j ∈ {1, 2, e} in slot
i ∈ {1, · · · , n}, where nodes are restricted to the field L ⊂ R2.
We use the boldface notation lj = {lj[i]}ni=1, to denote
the n-tuple location vectors for j ∈ {1, 2, e}. The distance
between nodes 1 and 2 in slot i is d12[i] = ‖l1[i] − l2[i]‖.
Similarly, d1e[i] and d2e[i] denote the sequence of distances
between nodes (1, e) and nodes (2, e) respectively. We use
the boldface notation d12, d1e, d2e for the n-tuple distance
vectors. Note that, in any slot the nodes form a triangle in R2,
as depicted in Figure 1, where φ12[i] , φ21[i], φ1e[i], φ2e[i]
denote the angles with respect to some coordinate axis. We
assume that the distances d12[i], d1e[i], d2e[i] take values in
the interval [dmin dmax], since the nodes cannot be closer to
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Fig. 1: Legitimate nodes and the eavesdropper form a triangle.
each other than dmin due to physical restrictions, and they
cannot be further than dmax away from each other due to their
limited communication range. We assume that the location
vectors l1, l2, le are ergodic processes. We will use the notation
s , [l1, l2, le] to summarize the state variables related to
mobility in the system. Note that s[i] ∈ L3 = L × L × L
for any i 1.
TABLE I: List of variables
var. Description
n number of slots
T number of steps in public discussion
dij distance between nodes i and j
L ∈ R2 the field where nodes are located
lj 2-D location of node j
φij angle between nodes i and j
dˆj , φˆj observation of nodes j ∈ {1, 2} of d12 and φj
dˆje observation of node e of dje and φje
oj complete observations of node j based on available GLI
s location triple [l1, l2, le]
s∆ quantized version of location triple, [l∆
1
, l∆
2
, l∆e ]
∆ quantization resolution
ψ uniform 2−D quantization function
s˜∆j [l˜
∆
1,j , l˜
∆
2,j , l˜
∆
e,j ]
l˜∆
k,j
node j’s estimate of l∆
k
based on all its information
κ(.,m) m-bit Gray coder
vj obtained binary key at node j before reconciliation
uj obtained binary key at node j after reconciliation
qj obtained binary key at node j after universal compression
kj final key at node j after universal hashing
B. Localization
At each time slot, there is a period in which the legitimate
nodes obtain information about their relative position with
respect to each other. As discussed in Section I-A, there
are various methods to establish the localization information.
In this paper, we will not treat these methods separately.
We will simply assume that, during measurement period i,
when node 1 transmits a beacon, nodes 2 and e obtain a
noisy observation of d12[i] and d1e[i] respectively. Let these
observation be dˆ2[i] and dˆ1e[i], respectively. Similarly, when
node 2 follows up with a beacon, nodes 1 and e obtain the
distance observations dˆ1[i] and dˆ2e[i], respectively. The nodes
may also independently observe their global positions, e.g.,
through a GPS device. They may also observe the angle
they make with respect to each other, if they are equipped
with direction sensitive localizers (e.g., directional antennas
in wireless localization). We consider two extreme cases on
1It is not necessary to use absolute coordinates for l1, l2, le. For example,
when global locations are not available at the nodes, we may assume that
node 1 is at the origin, i.e., l1[i] = [0 0] for all i
the global location information (GLI):
1) no GLI: The nodes do not have any knowledge of their
global location. However, with the observations of both the
beacons, the eavesdropper also obtains a noisy observation,
φˆe[i], of the angle between the legitimate nodes.
2) perfect GLI: Each node has perfect knowledge of its global
location, and a sense of orientation with respect to some
coordinate plane as shown in Figure 2. In this case, nodes
1, 2 obtain noisy observations φˆ1, φˆ2 of the angle φ12.
Similarly, node e obtains noisy observation φˆ1e, φˆ2e of the
angles φ1e,φ2e.
Let oj [i] denote the set of observations of node during slot
i, and oj , {oj [i]}ni=1. The observations oj for each case
is provided in Table II. We emphasize that, the observations
in each slot are obtained solely from the beacons exchanged
during that particular slot. The nodes’ final estimates of the
distances depend also on the observations during other slots,
due to predictable mobility patterns.
e
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Fig. 2: With GLI, the nodes obtain noisy observations of the
relative orientation of each other with respect to the x-axis.
TABLE II: Nodes’ Observations
No GLI Perfect GLI
o1[i] [dˆ1[i]] [dˆ1[i], φˆ1[i], l1[i]]
o2[i] [dˆ2[i]] [dˆ2[i], φˆ2[i], l2[i]]
oe[i] [dˆ1e[i], dˆ2e[i], φˆe[i]] [dˆ1e[i], dˆ2e[i], φˆ1e[i], φˆ2e[i], le[i]]
C. Attacker Model
We assume that there exists a passive eavesdropper e,
which does not transmit any beacons. However, node e can
strategically change its location to obtain a geographical
advantage against the legitimate nodes. Overall, we consider
two strategies:
Random Mobility: Eavesdropper moves randomly, without a
regard to the location of the legitimate nodes. We will assume
that eavesdropper adopts random mobility unless otherwise
stated.
Mobile Man in the Middle: Node e controls its mobility, such
that it can move accordingly to obtain a geographic advantage
compared to legitimate nodes. We consider the strategy where
node e moves to the mid-point of its maximum likelihood
4estimates of the legitimate nodes’ locations. For j ∈ {1, 2},
let us denote node e’s maximum likelihood estimate of node
j’s location at slot i, based on its observations up to slot i− 1
as l˜j,e[i]. Then,
l˜j,e[i] = arg max
lj [i]∈L
P(lj [i]|oe[1], . . . , oe[i− 1])
In other words, node 1 and node 2’s locations at slot i is
predicated by node e by its observations in the previous slots.
Then, at the beginning of each slot i, node e moves to the
mid-point of the estimates, which is (l˜1,e[i] + l˜2,e[i])/2.
Although we restricted ourselves to a single passive eaves-
dropper, we also discuss the implications of multiple eaves-
droppers. The eavesdroppers may utilize their observations in
two possible ways: (i) Non-colluding eavesdroppers do not
communicate, or share their observations with each other,
whereas (ii) colluding eavesdroppers combine their mea-
surements to obtain less noisy measurements. Note that, an
eavesdropper with multiple location sensors (e.g., multiple
antennas in the case of wireless radio-based localization) is
a special case of colluding eavesdroppers, as each sensor
could be viewed as a separate eavesdropper, with perfect links
between them. Theoretical secret key capacity under colluding
eavesdropper scenario is lower, due to cooperation of the
eavesdroppers, as discussed in Section III.
D. Notion of security
We consider the typical definition of source model of
information theoretic secrecy under a passive eavesdropper:
We assume that there exists an authenticated error-free public
channel, using which the legitimate nodes can communicate to
agree on secret keys, based on the observations of the distances
and angles (o1 and o2) obtained during beacon exchange.
This process, commonly referred to as public discussion [1],
is a T step message exchange protocol, where at any step
t ∈ {1, · · · , T }, node 1 sends message C1[t], and node 2
replies back with message C2[t] such that, for t > 1,
H
(
C1[t]|o1, {C1[i]}t−1i=1, {C2[i]}t−1i=1
)
= 0, odd t (1)
H
(
C2[t]|o2, {C1[i]}ti=1, {C2[i]}t−1i=1
)
= 0, even t. (2)
At the end of the T step protocol, node 1 obtains k1, and node
2 obtains k2 as the secret key, where
H
(
kj |oj, {C1[t], C2[t]}Tt=1
)
= 0, j ∈ {1, 2}. (3)
Definition 1: Secret key bits are generated (with respect to
the described attacker model) at rate R, if, for all ǫ > 0 and
δ > 0, there exists some n, T > 0 such that (1), (2) and (3)
are satisfied, and
H(kj)/n = R, j ∈ {1, 2} (4)
P(k1 6= k2) ≤ ǫ (5)
I(kj ;oe, {C1[t], C2[t]}Tt=1)/n ≤ δ, j ∈ {1, 2}. (6)
Here, (4)-(6) correspond to perfect randomness, reliability
and security constraints, respectively. The schemes proposed
in the literature typically use a random coding structure,
where {C1[t], C2[t]}Tt=1 are generated by using a binning
strategy [1]- [6]. In Section III, we will make use of these
existing results to provide computable theoretical bounds on
the achievable key rates.
III. THEORETICAL PERFORMANCE LIMITS
In this section, we provide information theoretical bounds
on the achievable key rate with perfect reliability. To evaluate
these bounds, we assume an idealized system by ignoring
the issues associated with quantization, cascade reconciliation
protocol, and privacy amplification. Thus, these bounds are
valid for any key generation scheme that satisfies Definition 1.
Theorem 1: A lower bound RL, and an upper bound RU
on the perfectly-reliable key rate achievable through public
discussion are
RL = max
{
lim
n→∞
1
n
[I(o1;o2)− I(o1;oe)]+ ,
lim
n→∞
1
n
[I(o2;o1)− I(o2;oe)]+
}
(7)
RU = lim
n→∞
1
n
min {I(o1;o2), I(o1;o2|oe)} (8)
respectively, where o1,o2 and oe are as given in Table II for
different possibilities of GLI.
The theorem follows2 from Theorem 4 in [18], which general-
izes Maurer’s results on secret key generation through public
discussion [1], to non-i.i.d. settings. Although tighter bounds
exist in the literature [2], [3], we use the above bounds since
they provide clearer insights into our systems due to their
simplicity.
Note that for the special case where the observations
(o1[i], o2[i], oe[i]) are i.i.d., we can safely drop the index i, and
denote the joint probability density function of observations
as f(o1, o2, oe). Therefore, the conditioning on the past and
future observations in RL and RU disappear, and the bounds
reduce to
RL =max
(
[I(o1; o2)− I(o1; oe)]+ ,
[I(o1; o2)− I(o2; oe)]+
)
(9)
RU =min (I(o1; o2), I(o1; o2|oe)) , (10)
Also note that Theorem 1 can be extended to provide key
rate bounds against multiple eavesdropper models discussed
in Section II-C. Consider K eavesdroppers, with observations
oe,1, . . . ,oe,K . For the non-colluding eavesdroppers model,
since the eavesdroppers are not communicating, we can safely
consider the most capable eavesdropper k. In other words,
in (7), (8) we can replace oe with oe,k for k ∈ {1, . . .K}
which yields the lowest bounds, and discard the rest of the
eavesdroppers. For the colluding eavesdroppers model, we can
replace the term oe in (7), (8) with oe,1, . . . ,oe,K since the
2Theorem 4 of [18] provide general upper and lower bounds including the
case where the source processes are not ergodic. In our system model, o1, o2
and oe are ergodic processes, hence they are information stable, therefore
these lower and upper bounds reduce to (7) and (8), respectively [17].
5eavesdroppers perfectly communicate with each other. It can
be directly observed that the bounds for colluding case are
lower with respect to the non-colluding case.
IV. GAUSSIAN OBSERVATIONS
To obtain more insights from theoretical results in Sec-
tion III, we focus on the following special case: First, we
assume that the node locations are individually Markov pro-
cesses such that
lj [i− 1]→ lj [i]→ lj [i+ 1], j ∈ {1, 2, e},
holds for any i, and their joint probability density function
f(l1, l2, le) is well defined. Secondly, all observations of dis-
tance and angle terms are i.i.d. Gaussian processes. This model
is typically used in the literature to characterize observation
noise [8], [19]. To that end, for no GLI, j ∈ {1, 2}
dˆj [i] = d12[i] + wj [i], wj [i]∼N
(
0,
γ(d12[i])ρj
P
)
(11)
dˆje[i] = dje[i] + wje[i], wje[i]∼N
(
0,
γ(dje[i])ρe
P
)
(12)
φˆe[i] = φe[i] + wφe [i], wφ[i]∼N
(
0,
γφ(d1e[i], d2e[i])ρe
P
)
(13)
are Gaussian noise processes, where P is the beacon power.
The observation noise variances are increasing functions of
the distance, which are modeled by the increasing functions
γ for distance observations and γφ for angle observations.
The parameter ρj depends on the capability of the nodes. For
instance, in wireless localization, γ and γφ depend on the path
loss exponent, and ρ depends on receiver antenna gain, number
of antennas, etc [8], [19]. For perfect GLI, we additionally
assume3 that for j ∈ {1, 2},
φˆj [i] = φj [i] + wφj [i], wφj [i]∼N
(
0,
γφ(d12[i])ρj
P
)
(14)
φˆje[i] = φje[i] + wφje [i], wφje [i]∼N
(
0,
γφ(dje[i])ρe
P
)
(15)
Clearly, the achievable key rates depend highly on the func-
tions γ, γφ and ρ. Note that, there there may be a bias on
these observations due to small scale fading [19]. The effect
of biased observations are studied in Appendix B.
A. Beacon Power Asymptotics
In this part, we analyze the beacon power asymptotics of the
system. We show that, if the eavesdropper does not observe
the angle4, i.e., φˆe = ∅, then RL increases unboundedly with
the beacon power P , which indicates that arbitrarily large
secret key rates can be obtained. However, when eavesdropper
observes the angle information, then RU remains bounded,
3For perfect GLI, the angle information is obtained according to a fixed
coordinate plane, hence the function γφ has single argument.
4Note that in some cases, the nodes cannot obtain any useful angle
information, e.g., in wireless localization, when each node is equipped with
a single omnidirectional antenna.
which indicates that the advantage gained by increasing beacon
power is rather limited. To clearly illustrate our insights, we
present our results for the no GLI scenario. However, the same
conclusion holds for the perfect GLI case as well.
Theorem 2: When the eavesdropper obtains angle informa-
tion, i.e., I(φˆe;φe) > 0,
lim
P→∞
RU <∞. (16)
The proof is in Appendix A, where we show that
limP→∞RU ≤ η, where
η =
1
2
log
{
2πE
[
ρe
d212
(
d212ρ1
ρe
γ(d12)
+ 4(d1e + d2e)
2(
√
γ(d1e) +
√
γ(d2e))
2
+ (4d1ed2e + 64(d1ed2e)
2)γφ(d1e, d2e)
+ 8(d1e + d2e)d1ed2e
(√
γ(d1e)
+
√
γ(d2e)
)√
γφ(d1e, d2e)
+ 64(d1e + d2e)
2(γ(d1e) + γ(d2e))
)]}
− 1
2
E
[
log (2πρ1γ(d12))
]
. (17)
The parameter η remains finite since the distances take on
values in some bounded range [dmin, dmax] with probability
1. Therefore, the secret key rate remains bounded.
Theorem 3: When the eavesdropper does not obtain any
angle information, i.e., I(φˆe;φe) = 0,
lim
P→∞
RL
1
2 log(P )
= lim
P→∞
RU
1
2 log(P )
= 1.
The proof is provided in Appendix A. Theorem 3 implies
that, without the angle observation at the eavesdropper, an
arbitrarily large key rate can be achieved with sufficiently large
beacon power P . However, the key rate increases with log(P ),
which means that increasing the beacon power would provide
diminishing returns.
B. Numerical Evaluations
We evaluate the theoretical bounds in Section III for Gaus-
sian observations model, using Monte Carlo simulations.
Setup: We consider a simple (M ×M) discrete 2-D grid,
which simulates a city with M blocks that covers a square field
of area A2, such that for any j ∈ {1, 2, e}, i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
lj [i] = [x y] ∈ { AM , . . . ,M AM } × { AM , . . . ,M AM }. Node
mobilities are Markov, and characterized by parameter B,
where
P
(
lj [i] = [x y] | lj [i− 1] = [x′ y′]
)
=

1
(B+1)2 if |x− x′| ≤ ABM
|y − y′| ≤ AB
M
0 otherwise
For no GLI, we choose γ(d) = 0.1 + d2, and
γφ(d1e, d2e) = π − π
1.1 + (d21e + d
2
2e)
,
6and for perfect GLI, we choose
γφ(dje) = π − π
1.1 + (dje)
2
such that both parameters are strictly increasing functions of
the distances. 5 We consider node capability parameters ρ1 =
ρ2 = ρe = 1, unless stated otherwise. The theoretical key
rates in Section III converge as n → ∞, therefore they are
calculated for large enough n, using the forward algorithm
procedure.
Results: Due to computational limitations, we consider
examples in which M ≤ 11, and B ≤ 3. Note that this choice
limits the maximum achievable secret key rate6.
Then, we analyze the effect of the different grid size, field
area and GLI on the theoretical key rates. In Figures 4 and 5,
we plot the bounds on the achievable key rate with respect to
the normalized beacon power P/σ20 for different grid size M
for no GLI and perfect GLI cases, respectively. We assumed
a constant ratio of field size and grid size, A/M = 1, and
considered B = 1. We can see that, there is a diminishing
return on the increased power levels for the achievable key
rate. Furthermore, we can see that increasing the field area
A2 has a negative impact on the key rate despite the increase
in M , which is due to the fact that the common information of
the legitimate nodes decreases as a result of increase in their
observation error variance. Next, in Figures 6 and 7, we plot
the bounds with respect to beacon power P , for different step
size B = 1 for no GLI and perfect GLI cases, respectively. We
assumed M = 5 for the no GLI case, and M = 7 for perfect
GLI case, and in both cases, the ratio of field size and grid
size is constant, such that A/M = 1. We can clearly see the
positive effect of the increased step size on the secret key rate.
This is due to the increase in different distance combinations
that are possible.
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Fig. 6: Upper and lower bounds for no GLI vs normalized
beacon power P/σ20 , M = A = 5, for different B
5A similar model for distance observation noise is used in [8]. Since φe ∈
[0, pi], the angle observation error variance cannot diverge with distance, and
we upper bounded the variance term by pi/1.1. To avoid zero error variances
at zero distance, we introduce a 0.1 offset to numerator and denominator of
γ and γφ, respectively.
6For instance, for B = 1, there are 13 different possible distance
combinations. Consequently, a key rate of log 13 is an absolute upper bound
for no GLI even in the case when the eavesdropper does not obtain any
observation.
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Finally, we analyze the effect of eavesdropper mobility on
the achievable key rate. In Figure 3, for M = 7, A = 5 and
B = 1, we plot the secret key rate bounds versus beacon
power for the cases where the eavesdropper i) follows the
random mobility pattern described in the setup with parameter
B = 1, ii) stays at the origin, and iii) follows the man in
the middle strategy described in Section II-C, i.e., moves to
the mid point of its location estimates of nodes 1 and 2.
We can see that, compared to following a random mobility
pattern, the eavesdropper can reduce the achievable secret key
rate significantly by following this strategy. However, the rate
still remains positive. We observe that the eavesdropper can
also reduce the key rate by simply staying static at a certain
favorable location, rather than moving randomly. However, in
practice this may not be feasible for the eavesdropper, since
by staying put, it will lose connection completely with the
legitimate nodes in a large region.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we showed that relative localization informa-
tion is an additional resource for generating secret key bits in
mobile networks. We studied the information theoretic limits
of secret key generation, and characterized lower and upper
bounds of key rates utilizing results for the cases in which the
nodes are/are not capable of observing their global locations.
Focusing on the special case where the observation noise is
i.i.d. Gaussian, we studied the beacon power asymptotics, and
observed that, interestingly, when the eavesdropper cannot
observe the angle information, the secret key rate grows
unboundedly. The following research directions can be further
investigated 1) theoretical performance analysis of secret key
generation in large networks, taking into account the recent
advances in network information theoretic security, and 2)
security analysis of various adversarial models, such as active
jamming attacks, or impersonation attacks in unauthenticated
networks.
APPENDIX A
PROOFS OF THEOREMS IN SECTION IV-A
A. Proof of Theorem 2
We first provide three lemmas that will be useful when
proving the theorem.
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Lemma 1: Let x and y be random variables. Then,
Var(x + y) ≤ 2Var(x) + 2Var(y). (18)
If x and y are independent, then Var(x + y) = Var(x) +
Var(y).
Proof: When x and y are not independent,
Var(x+ y) = Var(x) + Var(y) + 2Cov(x, y)
≤ Var(x) + Var(y) + 2
√
Var(x)Var(y)
≤ 2Var(x) + 2Var(y). (19)
where (19) follows from the fact that Var(x) + Var(y) ≥
2
√
Var(x)Var(y). When x and y are independent,
Cov(x, y) = 0, implying the result.
Lemma 2: Let x be a random variable such that E[x] ≥ µ,
where µ > −1. Let α =
√
1+µ
1+µ . Then, Var(
√
[1 + x]+) ≤
Var(αx).
Proof: Assume E[x] = µ′, where µ′ ≥ µ. Let α′ =√
1+µ′
1+µ′ . Let us define f1(x) ,
√
[1 + x]+, and f2(x) , α′(1+
x). Note that,
Var(
√
[1 + x]+) = Var(f1(x)) ≤ E
[
(f1(x)− E[f2(x)])2
]
since the centralized second moment is minimized around the
mean. Also,
Var(αx) ≥ Var(α′x) = Var(f2(x))
since µ′ ≥ µ, and α′ ≤ α. Therefore, it suffices to show that
∀x,
|f1(x) − E[f2(x)]| ≤ |f2(x)− E[f2(x)]| (20)
= |f2(x)−
√
1 + µ′|. (21)
i) First note that f1(µ′) = f2(µ′) =
√
1 + µ′. Therefore, the
condition (21) is satisfied for x = µ′.
ii) For x > µ′,
f1(x) ≤ f1(µ′) + f ′1(µ′)(x − µ′) (22)
≤
√
1 + µ′ + α(x − µ′) = f2(x)
where f ′1(µ′) is the first derivative of f1(x) at point x = µ′.
(22) follows from the fact that f1(x) is a strictly concave
function in the interval [−1 ∞). Therefore, condition (21) is
satisfied for x > µ′.
iii) Combining the facts that f1(x) is a strictly concave
function of x in the interval [−1 ∞); f2(x) is linear;
f1(−1) = f2(−1); and f1(µ′) = f2(µ′), we can see that√
1 + µ′ > f1(x) ≥ f2(x) when −1 < x < µ′. Therefore,
condition (21) is satisfied for −1 < x < µ′. iv) When x < −1,
f1(x) = 0 and f2(x) < 0, therefore, condition (21) is satisfied.
This concludes the proof.
Lemma 3: Let x, y be random variables. Then,
Var
(
E
[
1−
√
(1 + x)+
∣∣y]) ≤ E [(E[ |x| ∣∣ y])2] .
Proof: Note that
Var
(
E
[
1−
√
(1 + x)+
∣∣y])
≤ E
[
E
[
1−
√
(1 + x)+
∣∣y]2] .
Since for any x, |1−√(1 + x)+| ≤ |x|,∣∣∣∣E [1−√(1 + x)+ ∣∣y]
∣∣∣∣ ≤ E[ |x| ∣∣ y]
is satisfied for any y, which completes the proof.
Now, we proceed as follows. Assume without loss of gener-
ality that ρmin = min(ρ1, ρ2) = ρ1. When φˆe 6= ∅,
RU = lim
n→∞
1
n
I(dˆ1; dˆ2|dˆ1e, dˆ2e, φˆe)
≤ lim
n→∞
1
n
(
h(dˆ1|dˆ1e, dˆ2e, φˆe)− h(dˆ1|d12)
) (23)
≤ lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
(
h(dˆ1[i]|dˆ1e[i], dˆ2e[i], φˆe[i])−
h(dˆ1[i]− d12[i]|d12[i])
)
=h(dˆ1|dˆ1e, dˆ1e, φˆe)− h(dˆ1 − d12|d12) (24)
where (23) follows from the fact that dˆ1 → d12 →
(dˆ2, dˆ1e, dˆ2e, φˆe) forms a Markov chain, and (24) fol-
lows from the fact that all of the random variables
dˆ1[i], dˆ1e[i], dˆ2e[i], φˆe[i] have a stationary distribution, denoted
as dˆ1, dˆ1e, dˆ2e and φˆe, respectively. The second term in (24)
can be found as
h(dˆ1 − d12|d12) = 1
2
E
[
log
(
γ(d12)ρ1
P
)]
(25)
8from the definition of dˆ1[i]. Now, we bound the first term in
(24). Let us define
dˆe ,
√
[dˆ21e + dˆ
2
2e − 2dˆ1edˆ2e cos(φˆe)]+.
Then,
h(dˆ1|dˆ1e, dˆ2e, φˆe) ≤ h
(
dˆ1|dˆe
) ≤ h(dˆ1 − dˆe). (26)
Note that for a given variance, Gaussian distribution max-
imizes the entropy. Therefore, the entropy of a Gaussian
random variable that has a variance identical to that of dˆ1− dˆe
will be an upper bound for (26). We proceed as follows.
Var
(
dˆ1 − dˆe
)
=E
[
Var
(
dˆ1 − dˆe|d12, d1e, d2e
)]
+ Var
(
E
[
dˆ1 − dˆe|d12, d1e, d2e
])
, (27)
where (27) follows from the fact that for any dependent ran-
dom variables x and y, Var(x) = E[Var(x|y)]+Var(E[x|y]).
We now find an upper bound on the first term of (27). Note
that,
Var
(
dˆ1 − dˆe|d12, d1e, d2e
)
=Var(dˆ1|d12)
+ Var
(
dˆe|d12, d1e, d2e
) (28)
due to Lemma 1, since dˆ1 → (d12, d1e, d2e) →
(dˆ1e, dˆ2e, φˆe) → dˆe forms a Markov chain, and the fact that
dˆ1 is independent of d1e, d2e given d12. The first term in (28)
is equal to
Var(dˆ1|d12) = Var
(
w1|d12
)
=
γ(d12)ρ1
P
. (29)
We bound the second term in (28) as follows. Let us define
κ ,
1
d212
(
2(d1e − d2e cos(φˆe))w1e + w1e2
+ w2e
2 + 2(d2e − d1e cos(φˆe))w2e
+ 2d1ed2e(cos(φe)− cos(φˆe))− 2w1ew2e cos(φˆe)
)
.
Then,
Var(dˆe|d12, d1e, d2e)
= Var
{([
d21e + d
2
2e + 2(d1e − d2e cos φˆe)w1e+
2(d2e − d1e cos φˆe)w2e − 2d1ed2e cos φˆe + w1e2
+ w2e
2 − 2w1ew2e cos φˆe
]+)0.5
|d12, d1e, d2e
}
(30)
≤ d212Var(
√
[1 + κ]+), (31)
where (30) follows due to the definitions of dˆ1e, dˆ2e and φˆe.
(31) follows due to definition of κ, and the cosine law d212 =
d21e + d
2
2e − 2d1ed2e cos(φe). Now we will apply Lemma 2 to
bound (31). First, note that
E[κ] =
1
d212
E
[
w21e + w
2
2e − 2d1ed2e(cosφe − cos φˆe)
]
≥ 1
Pd212
E
[
w21e + w
2
2e − 2d1ed2e|wφe |
]
≥ ρe
Pd212
E
[
γ(d1e) + γ(d2e)− 2d1ed2e
√
2Pγφ(d1e, d2e)
πρe
]
,
(32)
where (32) follows from the fact that since wφe is zero
mean Gaussian, |wφe | follows a Half-normal distribution with
E(|wφe |) =
√
2γφ(d1e,d2e)ρe
Ppi
. We can choose P1 such that for
any beacon power P > P1, E[x] > − 34 . Let µ = − 34 , and
α =
√
1+µ
1+µ = 2. Due to Lemma 2, we obtain
d212Var(
√
[1 + κ]+) ≤ d212Var(ακ)
≤4α
2
d212
(
Var(2(d1e − d2e cos(φˆe))w1e) (33)
+ Var(2(d2e − d1e cos(φˆe))w2e)
+ Var(2d1ed2e(cos(φe)− cos(φˆe)))
+ Var(2w1ew2e cos(φˆe)) + Var(w
2
1e) + Var(w
2
2e)
)
≤E
[
16ρe
Pd212
(
4(d1e + d2e)
2(γ(d1e) + γ(d2e)) (34)
+ 4(d1ed2e)
2γφ(d1e, d2e) + o
(
1
P
))]
, (35)
where (33) follows from applying Lemma 1 to Var(κ) twice,
and (35) follows from the fact that
Var(2(die − dje cos(φˆe))wie) ≤ Var(2(die + dje)wie)
for i, j ∈ {1, 2}, and
Var(2d1ed2e(cos(φe)− cos(φˆe)))
= Var(2d1ed2e(cos(φe)− cos(φe + wφ))
≤ Var(2d1ed2ewφ).
Now, we upper bound the second term of (27) as
Var
(
E
[
dˆ1 − dˆe|d12, d1e, d2e
])
= Var
(
d12E
[
1−
√
(1 + κ)
+|d12, d1e, d2e
])
(36)
≤ E
[
d212
(
E
[|x| |d12, d1e, d2e])2] (37)
≤ E
[
1
d212
E
[
2(d1e + d2e)(|w1e|+ |w2e|) + w21e + w22e
+ 2d1ed2e|wφe |+ 2|w1ew2e| |d12, d1e, d2e
]2]
= E
[
ρ2e
Pd212
(
2(d1e + d2e)
√
γ(d1e) +
√
γ(d2e)√
ρe
+ 2d1ed2eγφ(d1e, d2e)
+
γ(d1e) + γ(d2e)√
P
+ 2
√
γ(d1e) + γ(d2e)√
Pρe
)2]
(38)
= E
[
ρ2e
Pd212
(
4(d1e + d2e)
2
ρe
(
√
γ(d1e) +
√
γ(d2e))
2
+ 4(d1ed2eγφ(d1e, d2e))
2
+
8(d1e + d2e)d1ed2e
ρe
(√
γ(d1e)
+
√
γ(d2e)
)√
γφ(d1e, d2e)
)]
+ o(1/P ). (39)
9where (36) follows from the fact that dˆe = d12
√
(1 + κ)+,
and (37) follows from Lemma 3. Finally, we obtain
RU ≤ h(dˆ1 − dˆe)− h(dˆ1 − d12|d12) (40)
≤ 1
2
log
(
2πVar(dˆ1 − dˆe)
)
− h(w1|d12) (41)
=
1
2
log
{
2πE
[
ρe
d212P
(
d212ρ1
ρe
γ(d12)
+ 4(d1e + d2e)
2(
√
γ(d1e) +
√
γ(d2e))
2
+ (4d1ed2e + 64(d1ed2e)
2)γφ(d1e, d2e)
+ 8(d1e + d2e)d1ed2e
(√
γ(d1e)
+
√
γ(d2e)
)√
γφ(d1e, d2e)
+ 64(d1e + d2e)
2(γ(d1e) + γ(d2e))
)
+ o
(
1
P
)]}
− 1
2
E
[
log
(
2πρ1γ(d12)
P
)]
, (42)
where (40) follows from (24) and (26), (41) follows from the
fact that entropy of dˆ1− dˆe is upper bounded by the entropy of
a Gaussian random variable that has the same variance as dˆ1−
dˆe. The first term of (42) is obtained by combining combining
(29), (35) and (39), and the second term of (42) follows from
(25). As P →∞, the P terms in (42) cancel each other since
for any random variables u and v,
lim
P→∞
logE
[
u
P
+ o
(
1
P
)]
− E
[
log
v
P
]
= logE[u]− E[log v]
hence limP→∞RU <∞.
B. Proof of Theorem 3
When the eavesdropper does not observe the angle, φˆe = ∅.
Hence
RL = lim
n→∞
1
n
(
h(dˆ1|dˆ1e, dˆ2e)− h(dˆ1|dˆ2)
)
(43)
First, we show that the first term in (43) is finite.
lim
P,n→∞
1
n
h(dˆ1|dˆ1e, dˆ2e) = lim
n→∞
1
n
h(d12|d1e,d2e)
= lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
h(d12[i]|d1e,d2e, {d12[j]}i−1j=1)
= lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
h(d12[i]|d1e,d2e, {φe[j]}i−1j=1) (44)
= lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
h
((
d1e[i]
2 + d2e[i]
2−
2d1e[i]d2e[i] cos(φe[i])
)0.5|d1e,d2e, {φe[j]}i−1j=1
)
> −∞
(45)
where (44) follows from the fact that a triangle is completely
characterized by either three sides (d12[i] d1e[i], d2e[i]), or two
sides and an angle (d12[i] d1e[i], φe[i]). Equation (45) follow
from the cosine law. Since the probability density function
of φe,d12 and d1e,d2e are well defined, we can see that
h(φe[i]|d1e,d2e, {φe[j]}i−1j=1) > −∞. The second term
1
n
h(dˆ1|dˆ2) ≤ 1
n
h(dˆ1 − dˆ2) = h(w1 − w2) (46)
≤ 1
2
log
(
2πE
[
4ρmaxγ(d12)
P
])
(47)
=
1
2
log
(
2πE [4ρmaxγ(d12)]
)− 1
2
log(P ).
where (46) follows due to the fact that conditioning reduces
entropy, (47) follows from the fact dˆ1[i]− dˆ2[i] = w1[i]−w2[i]
for any i. Dropping the index i, we can see that h(w1 − w2)
is upper bounded by entropy of a Gaussian random variable
that has the same variance as w1 − w2, which is
Var(w1 − w2) = Var(E[w1 − w2]) + E(Var[w1 − w2])
= Ed12(Var[w1 − w2]) ≤ E
[
4ρmaxγ(d12)
P
]
.
Therefore, we can see that limP→∞ RL1
2
log(P )
≥ 1 Now, we
find an upper bound on RU . Note that
RU = lim
n→∞
1
n
I(dˆ1; dˆ2|dˆ1e, dˆ2e)
≤ lim
n→∞
1
n
(
h(dˆ1|dˆ1e, dˆ2e)− h(dˆ1|d12) (48)
where the first term of (48) is finite. The second term can be
upper bounded as
1
n
h(dˆ1|d12) = h(w1|d12)
≥ E
[
1
2
log
(
2πρ1γ(d12)
P
)]
=
1
2
E [log (2πρ1γ(d12))]− 1
2
log(P ),
therefore limP→∞ RU1
2
log(P )
≤ 1. Since RL ≤ RU by defini-
tion, the proof is complete.
APPENDIX B
ON OBSERVATION BIAS
Nodes’ observations may have bias due to several factors.
We consider two different source of bias; clock mismatch and
multipath fading. We will see that different types of bias may
have different outcomes. In this part, we present our results for
no GLI. However, the conclusions are valid for perfect GLI
as well.
A. Clock Mismatch
Assume that there is a clock mismatch between nodes 1,
and 2. Consequently, all the observations of d12 of nodes 1
and 2 in localization phase are shifted by a random value η1
and η2 respectively:
dˆj [i] = d12[i] + wj [i] + ηj (49)
for j ∈ {1, 2}, where wj [i] is as given in (11). We assume the
amount of clock mismatch is a non-random, but unknown pa-
rameter, which remains constant througout the entire session7.
Since wj [i], j ∈ {1, 2} are zero mean random variables,
E[dˆj [i]|η1, η2] = E[d12[i]] + ηj . (50)
7The underlying assumption is that, the clock mismatch variations are much
slower than the duration of the key-generation sessions
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Hence, with the knowledge of the statistics of the mobility,
each node j ∈ {1, 2} can obtain a perfect estimate of
the amount of clock mismatch ηj as n → ∞, by simply
calculating the difference between the long-term average of
the distance observations dˆj [i] for all i and the known mean
distance E[d12]. Then this value can be broadcast in the public
discussion phase. Therefore, clock mismatch does not affect
the theoretical bounds of secret key generation rates.
B. Multipath Fading
There may be a bias in the observations when the nodes
experience multipath fading. An example of this is time of
arrival observation of distances when the nodes are not within
their line of sight. Note that, this kind of bias does not remain
constant, and varies from one slot to the other. The impact
of fading can be viewed as that of an additional observation
noise source and the distance observations can be written as
dˆj [i] = d12[i] + wj [i] + ηj [i]
for j ∈ {1, 2}.
Consequently, one will observe a reduction in the key rate.
For example, with no angle observation at the eavesdropper,
we know from Section IV-A that the key rate grows un-
boundedly with the beacon power P . However, with multipath
fading, independent over different locations,
lim
P→∞
h(dˆ1|dˆ2) = h(η1|η2)
(a)
= h(η1) > −∞,
where η1 = {η1[i]}ni=1, and (a) follows since η1 and η2
are independent. Hence, following an identical approach to
Section IV-A, one see that limP→∞RL < ∞, i.e., the
secret key rate remains bounded even as the power grows
unboundedly.
REFERENCES
[1] U. M. Maurer, “Secret key agreement by public discussion from common
information,” IEEE Trans. Information Theory, vol.39, no.3, pp.733-742,
May 1993
[2] R. Ahlswede and I. Csiszar, “Common randomness in information theory
and cryptography. I. Secret sharing,” IEEE Trans. Information Theory ,
vol.39, no.4, pp.1121-1132, Jul 1993
[3] U. M. Maurer and S. Wolf, “Unconditionally secure key agreement and
the intrinsic conditional information,” IEEE Trans. Information Theory
, vol.45, no.2, pp.499-514, Mar 1999
[4] I. Csiszar and P. Narayan, “Secrecy capacities for multiterminal channel
models,” IEEE Trans. Information Theory, vol.54, no.6, pp.2437-2452,
June 2008
[5] U. M. Maurer and S. Wolf, “Secret-key agreement over unauthenticated
public channels .I. Definitions and a completeness result,” IEEE Trans-
actions on Information Theory, vol.49, no.4, pp. 822- 831, April 2003
[6] I. Csiszar and P. Narayan, “Common randomness and secret key
generation with a helper,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory,
vol.46, no.2, pp.344-366, Mar 2000
[7] U. M. Maurer, and S. Wolf, “Information-theoretic key agreement: From
weak to strong secrecy for free,” Advances in CryptologyEUROCRYPT
2000, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2000.
[8] S. Gezici, Z. Tian, G. B. Giannakis, H. Kobayashi, A.F. Molisch, H.V.
Poor, and Z. Sahinoglu, “Localization via ultra-wideband radios: a
look at positioning aspects for future sensor networks,” IEEE Signal
Processing Magazine, vol.22, no.4, pp. 70- 84, July 2005
[9] Y. Shen and M.Z. Win,“Fundamental limits of wideband localization
Part I: A general framework,” IEEE Trans. Information Theory, vol.56,
no.10, pp.4956-4980, Oct. 2010
[10] H. Buhrman, N. Chandran, V. Goyal, R. Ostrovsky and C. Schaffner,
“Position-based quantum cryptography: Impossibility and construc-
tions,”, 2010
[11] A. Srivinasan and J. Vu, “A survey on secure localization in wireless sen-
sor networks”, Encyclopedia of Wireless and Mobile Communications,
2007
[12] R. Poovendran, C. Wang, S. Roy, “Secure localization and time syn-
chronization for wireless sensor and ad-hoc networks”, Springer Verlag,
2007
[13] N. Chandran, V. Goyal, R. Moriarty and R. Ostrovsky,
“Position based cryptography,” Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2009,
http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/
[14] Wilson, R.; Tse, D.; Scholtz, R.A.; , “Channel identification: Secret
sharing using reciprocity in ultrawideband channels,” IEEE International
Conf. Ultra-Wideband, ICUWB 2007, pp.270-275, 24-26 Sept. 2007
[15] Kirchner, Nathan, and Tomonari Furukawa, “Infrared localisation for
indoor uavs,” ICST05: Proceedings of the 2005 International Conference
on Sensing Technology, 2005.
[16] Jimnez, A. R., and F. Seco, “Ultrasonic localization methods for accurate
positioning,” Instituto de Automatica Industrial, Madrid (2005).
[17] S. Verdu and T. S. Han, “A general formula for channel capacity,” IEEE
Transactions on Information Theory, vol.40, no.4, pp.1147-1157, Jul
1994
[18] M. R. Bloch and J. N. Laneman, “Secrecy from resolvability,”
arXiv:1105.5419 [cs.IT], May 2011
[19] D. Jourdan, D. Dardari and M. Win, “Position error bound for UWB
localization in dense cluttered environments,” IEEE Transactions on
Aerospace and Electronic Systems, vol.44, no.2, pp.613-628, April 2008
[20] S. Mathur, W. Trappe, N. Mandayam, C. Ye and A. Reznik, “Radio-
telepathy: extracting a secret key from an unauthenticated wireless
channel,” Proceedings of the 14th ACM international conference on
Mobile computing and networking (MobiCom ’08) ACM, New York,
NY, USA, 128-139
[21] S. Jana, S. N. Premnath, M. Clark, S. K. Kasera, N. Patwari and S.
V. Krishnamurthy, “On the effectiveness of secret key extraction from
wireless signal strength in real environments,” Proceedings of the 15th
annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
(MobiCom ’09) ACM, New York, NY, USA, 321-332
[22] J. Zhang, S.K. Kasera and N. Patwari, “Mobility assisted secret key
generation using wireless link signatures,” Proc. IEEE INFOCOM 2010,
vol., no., pp.1-5, 14-19 March 2010
[23] N. Patwari, J. Croft, S. Jana and S. K. Kasera, “High-rate uncorrelated bit
extraction for shared secret key generation from channel measurements,”
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing , vol.9, no.1, pp.17-30, Jan.
2010
[24] C. Ye, S. Mathur, A. Reznik, Y. Shah, W. Trappe, and N. B. Mandayam,
“Information-theoretically secret key generation for fading wireless
channels,” IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security,
no. 2 (2010): 240-254.
[25] S. Banerjee and A. Mishra, “Secure spaces: Location-based secure group
communication for wireless networks,” ACM MobiCom, vol. 7, pp. 68
70, Sep. 2002.
[26] A. Pierrot, R. Chou and M. Bloch, “Practical Limitations of Secret-Key
Generation in Narrowband Wireless Environments,” arXiv:1312.3304
[cs.IT], Dec. 2012
[27] S. Mathur, R. Miller, A. Varshavsky, W. Trappe, and N. Mandayam,
‘Proximate: Proximity-based secure pairing using ambient wireless
signals,” ACM MobiSys, pp. 211224, Jun. 2011.
[28] NIST, “A statistical test suite for the validation of random number
generators and pseudo random number generators for cryptographic
applications,” 2001
[29] G.Brassard and L. Salvail, “Secret-key reconciliation by public dis-
cussion,” in Workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic
techniques on Advances in cryptology (EUROCRYPT ’93), Tor Helleseth
(Ed.). Springer-Verlag New York, Inc., Secaucus, NJ, USA, 410-423.
[30] https://code.google.com/p/miniz/
[31] O. S. Oguejiofor, V. N. Okorogu and OBO Adewale Abe, “Outdoor lo-
calization system using RSSI measurement of wireless sensor network”
[32] D. Klinc, H. Jeongseok, S.W. McLaughlin, J. Barros and K. Byung-Jae,
“LDPC Codes for the gaussian wiretap channel,” IEEE Transactions on
Information Forensics and Security, vol.6, no.3, pp.532,540, Sept. 2011
[33] O. Gungor, F. Chen; Koksal, C.E., “Secret key generation from mobility,”
Proc. IEEE 2011 GLOBECOM Workshop on Physical Layer Security,
pp.874,878, 5-9 Dec. 2011
